Managerial workarounds in three European DRG systems by Sheaff, Rod et al.
 
 
University of Birmingham
Managerial workarounds in three European DRG
systems
Sheaff, Rod; Morando, Verdiana; Chambers, Naomi; Exworthy, Mark; Mahon, Ann; Byng,
Richard; Mannion, Russell
DOI:
10.1108/JHOM-10-2019-0295
License:
Creative Commons: Attribution (CC BY)
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Citation for published version (Harvard):
Sheaff, R, Morando, V, Chambers, N, Exworthy, M, Mahon, A, Byng, R & Mannion, R 2020, 'Managerial
workarounds in three European DRG systems', Journal of Health, Organization and Management.
https://doi.org/10.1108/JHOM-10-2019-0295
Link to publication on Research at Birmingham portal
General rights
Unless a licence is specified above, all rights (including copyright and moral rights) in this document are retained by the authors and/or the
copyright holders. The express permission of the copyright holder must be obtained for any use of this material other than for purposes
permitted by law.
•	Users may freely distribute the URL that is used to identify this publication.
•	Users may download and/or print one copy of the publication from the University of Birmingham research portal for the purpose of private
study or non-commercial research.
•	User may use extracts from the document in line with the concept of ‘fair dealing’ under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (?)
•	Users may not further distribute the material nor use it for the purposes of commercial gain.
Where a licence is displayed above, please note the terms and conditions of the licence govern your use of this document.
When citing, please reference the published version.
Take down policy
While the University of Birmingham exercises care and attention in making items available there are rare occasions when an item has been
uploaded in error or has been deemed to be commercially or otherwise sensitive.
If you believe that this is the case for this document, please contact UBIRA@lists.bham.ac.uk providing details and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate.
Download date: 14. Jun. 2020
Managerial workarounds in three
European DRG systems
Rod Sheaff
School of Law, Criminology and Government, Plymouth University, Plymouth, UK
Verdiana Morando
CERGAS Research Centre, SDA Bocconi Scuola di Direzione Aziendale, Milano,
Lombardia, Italy and
GSD Healthcare, Dubai, United Arab Emirates
Naomi Chambers
AllianceManchester Business School, TheUniversity ofManchester,Manchester, UK
Mark Exworthy
University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK
Ann Mahon
AllianceManchester Business School, TheUniversity ofManchester,Manchester, UK
Richard Byng
Plymouth University Peninsula Schools of Medicine and Dentistry,
Plymouth University, Plymouth, UK, and
Russell Mannion
University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK
Abstract
Purpose –Attempts to transform health systems have in many countries involved starting to pay healthcare
providers through a DRG system, but that has involved managerial workarounds. Managerial workarounds
have seldom been analysed. This paper does so by extending and modifying existing knowledge of the causes
and character of clinical and IT workarounds, to produce a conceptualisation of the managerial workaround. It
further develops and revises this conceptualisation by comparing the practical management, at both provider
and purchaser levels, of hospital DRG payment systems in England, Germany and Italy.
Design/methodology/approach – We make a qualitative test of our initial assumptions about the
antecedents, character and consequences of managerial workarounds by comparing them with a systematic
comparison of case studies of the DRG hospital payment systems in England, Germany and Italy. The data
collection through key informant interviews (N5 154), analysis of policy documents (N5 111) and an action
learning set, began in 2010–12, with additional data collection from key informants and administrative
documents continuing in 2018–19 to supplement and update our findings.
Findings –Managers in all three countries developed very similar workarounds to contain healthcare costs to
payers. To weaken DRG incentives to increase hospital activity, managers agreed to lower DRG payments for
episodes of care above an agreed case-load ‘ceiling’ and reduced payments by less than the full DRG amounts
when activity fell below an agreed ‘floor’ volume.
Research limitations/implications – Empirically this study is limited to three OECD health systems, but
since our findings come from both Bismarckian (social-insurance) and Beveridge (tax-financed) systems, they
are likely to bemore widely applicable. Inmany countries, DRGs coexist with non-DRG or pre-DRG systems, so
these findingsmay also reflect a specific, perhaps transient, stage in DRG-system development. Probably there
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are also other kinds of managerial workaround, yet to be researched. Doing so would doubtlessly refine and
nuance the conceptualisation of the ‘managerial workaround’ still further.
Practical implications – In the case of DRGs, the managerial workarounds were instances of ‘constructive
deviance’ which enabled payers to reduce the adverse financial consequences, for them, arising from DRG
incentives. The understanding of apparent failures or part-failures to transform a health system can be made
more nuanced, balanced and diagnostic by using the concept of the ‘managerial workaround’.
Social implications –Managerial workarounds also appear outside the health sector, so the present analysis
of managerial workaroundsmay also have application to understanding attempts to transform such sectors as
education, social care and environmental protection.
Originality/value – So far as we are aware, no other study presents and tests the concept of a ‘managerial
workaround’. Pervasive, non-trivial managerial workarounds may be symptoms of mismatched policy
objectives, or that existing health system structures cannot realise current policy objectives; but the
workarounds themselves may also contain solutions to these problems.
Keywords Germany, Italy, England, DRG, Diagnostic related group, Managerial workaround
Paper type Research paper
Many attempts to increase healthcare providers’ efficiency and contain the growth of costs
have included a policy of paying healthcare providers through a Diagnostic Related Group
(DRG) system. In practice that has involved managerial workarounds at the payer–
provider interface. Unlike clinical and IT workarounds, managerial workarounds at
organisational and inter-organisational level have seldom been analysed. This paper’s
original contribution is to extend the concept of workaround for application to managerial
activities. It exposes some implications for health policy, including the transformation of
health systems by means of DRG payment systems. First we abstract the generic
characteristics, antecedents and consequences attributed to workarounds at work-process
level. Next we infer what the corresponding characteristics, antecedents and consequences
would be, for managerial activity. We then apply that conceptualisation empirically to
analyse data about DRG payment systems for hospitals in England, Germany and Italy.
The policy rationales and consequences of these three DRG systems are more widely
reported than the managerial workarounds which help them operate, so we also add that
analysis to the empirical literature. In light of our empirical findings, we refine and adjust
our initial conceptualisation of managerial workarounds. We conclude that research into
health system transformation, policy conflicts and implementation deficits can be made
more nuanced and diagnostic by adding the concept of the ‘managerial workaround’ to the
analytic and diagnostic repertoire.
1. Background
1.1 The prototype: work-process workarounds
Workarounds are the ways in which individual workers or work groups informally by-pass
or alter the ways in which a formalised work process is executed, so that they can fulfil its
task in another way (Halbesleben et al., 2008). Studies of clinical and healthcare IT
workarounds havemostly focused on the informalmodification, even subversion, of officially
sanctioned work processes (De Bono et al., 2010; Halbesleben et al., 2008), for example, in
nursing (De Bono et al., 2013), operating theatre safety (Reason, 2005), or the use of electronic
patient records (Bar-Lev, 2015). Work processes are anyway typically discretionary: within
limits, workers adjust them according to circumstances.Workarounds, however, adjust them
further, beyond officially prescribed boundaries, to create informal, unauthorised
improvisations that replace official rules and work processes with alternatives that the
improviser thinks are more effective or practicable. Often workarounds emerge as
improvised repairs of ill-designed, incomplete, impracticable, over-restrictive or otherwise
dysfunctional work processes (Bar-Lev, 2015; Vogelsmeier et al., 2008) which make complex
tasks still more difficult (De Bono et al., 2013). Generally workarounds are responses to
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organisational problems (Lalley and Malloch, 2010) (e.g. inter-professional or inter-
departmental boundaries, role ambiguity), practical inadequacies of new technologies
(Coiera, 2007), over-work (Guedon et al., 2017), inflexible rules or communication blockages
(De Bono et al., 2013).
Such workarounds therefore have four main characteristics. They firstly extend a work
process (e.g. using paper alongside electronic records (Ellingsen et al., 2013)) or partly transfer
it to another profession (Reiz and Gewald, 2016). Such extensions may then require non-
standard use of the ‘boundary objects’ used to structure and coordinate work across
professional and organisational boundaries (e.g. adding free-text notes to checklists) (Bar-Lev,
2015), stretching discretion or exploiting under-definitions of work routines (e.g. making
observations instead of asking the patient about her pain (Wallenburg et al., 2019)), re-
sequencing tasks (e.g. recording a patient as having taken medication before she took it)
(Koppel et al., 2008), or using resources intended for one work process for another (e.g. ‘off-
label’ prescribing: using a medicine to treat conditions for which it is not licensed). Clinicians
may employ their own, alternative diagnostic typologies, recording a more acceptable or
lucrative diagnosis on official paperwork and negotiating diagnoses with patients (Whooley,
2010). These extensions enable staff to use a work process more widely than managers
intended or for additional purposes (e.g. prescribing a placebo).
Secondly, other parts of a work process may either be used less than officially intended or
simply ignored, for example, by disabling warning or safety equipment or disregarding its
warnings (Vogelsmeier et al., 2008). Staff may omit elements (Halbesleben et al., 2008; Koppel
et al., 2008) that appear unnecessarily laborious (e.g. using voice-recorders instead of typing
(Reiz and Gewald, 2016)).
Workarounds are, thirdly, organised informally. Some are enacted individually and others
collectively, whether by tacit agreement (De Bono et al., 2013) or explicit negotiation
(Ellingsen et al., 2013), for example, to defend professional ‘autonomy’.Whenmanagers do not
just ignore, or even promote (Cresswell et al., 2016), them workarounds usually incur lower
penalties for a worker than overt resistance will.
Fourth, the purpose of workarounds is to overcome the aforementioned problems so that
the work process achieves its aims more fully and reliably. Some writers describe
workarounds as ‘violations’ (Reason, 2005), ‘resistance’ (Reiz and Gewald, 2016) or
circumventing the systems for maintaining service quality and safety (Guedon et al., 2017),
as error-creating (Koppel et al., 2008) or as obstacles to systematic problem-solving. Far from
instantiating error, laziness, self-interest, neglect or incompetence, however, many
workarounds are ‘reinventions’ (Barrett and Stephens, 2017) which improve work-process
resilience (Alper and Karsh, 2009), even at some cost for the improvisers themselves, and if
one workaround then necessitates others (Ellingsen et al., 2013). Kobayashi et al. (2005) it
suggests that workarounds are temporary, but those which introduce demonstrably better
work processes may gradually become normal working practice (Vogelsmeier et al., 2008;
Zhou et al., 2011), because they get the work done (De Bono et al., 2013).
1.2 Managerial workarounds
Managerial routines are above all the second-order routines through which managers
coordinate, control, resource and monitor the activities of those who execute the technical,
first-order work processes discussed earlier. To do so, managers typically use tailored
combinations of persuasion, financial or other incentives, resource allocation, delegating
responsibility, relationality, coercion and work monitoring. Managerial workarounds would
affect the work of implementing policy mandates, whether national policy or organisational-
level priorities, rather than clinical work, and affect organisational- and inter-organisational
information flows. A repeat search (28th November 2019) of Google Scholar for English-
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language journal papers published during 2009–2019 which contained the phrase
‘managerial workaround’ or ‘management workaround’ (or ‘work-around’) still yielded
just 15 hits, eight concerning IT only, four work-processes only, one accounting systems
only and two concerning household or family firm settings: too little material for a
systematic review. We had to develop the concept of a managerial workaround almost from
scratch.
Transposing the earlier analysis of work-process workarounds onto managerial activity,
onewould expect managerial workarounds to occur whenmanagers perceived themandate as:
(1) Relying on missing or unreliable organisational structures or systems, for example,
for information sharing, staff deployment or procurement.
(2) Facing organisational obstacles or resistance.
(3) Having to be implemented through, or despite, restrictive regulations.
(4) Threatening managers’ occupational interests (e.g. power, income, status).
(5) Involving conflicting objectives and incentives, so that implementing one policy
obstructs another.
(6) Involving difficult, complex tasks depending on factors that the managers cannot
fully control or predict.
Correspondingly one would predict that managerial workarounds would extend formal
organisational or inter-organisational structures and managerial practices, using them for
additional purposes than mandated. Then, managers would use their managerial discretion
maximally, use resources intended for one use also for another and adjust what
organisational-level monitoring systems report and how managers responded. Inter-
organisational relationships, co-ordination mechanisms and boundary objects would be
similarly altered and re-used. Concomitantly the use of other organisational or inter-
organisational structures and managerial practices might diminish. Managers would not
implement (or only symbolically implement) what they regarded as laborious, redundant or
perverse elements of a mandate. Like technical workarounds, managerial ones would be
initiated and established informally, by tacit agreement or explicit negotiation, whether
enacted individually or collectively.
Suchmanagerialworkaroundswould serve thepurpose of increasing thepractical resilienceof
existing organisational and inter-organisational structures and of enhancing policy
implementation. Their character is therefore likely also to reflect their particular organisational,
health system and policy context. Work-process workarounds apply only to practitioners’
activities within provider organisations, but managerial workarounds develop as much in payer
asprovider organisations. Sincework-processworkarounds are claimed to frustrate policy-driven
attempts tomakehealthcare saferandofhigherquality, thequestionarisesofwhethermanagerial
workarounds, analogously, frustrate policy attempts to transform health systems.
1.3 DRG systems: incubator for managerial workarounds?
In the 1990s, many European health systems were being transformed into more market-like
structures to make them more manageable, contain the growth of healthcare spending,
promote competition and open healthcare provision to a wider range of providers (corporate,
not-for-profit, owner-managed, etc.). One consequence was to adopt DRGs as themain pricing
unit for hospital services. Each of the DRG groups together clinical diagnoses (usually from
the International Classification of Diseases) on the basis first of broad clinical speciality
(‘Major Diagnostic Category’), then whether surgical or non-surgical treatment is usual and
then by other characteristics, varying by country, which predict the total cost of care for the
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patients so diagnosed (e.g. length of stay). Each DRG is thus approximately homogeneous in
terms of treatment costs within that country (Busse et al., 2013). DRGs thereby commodify
health care in the sense of standardising the definitions of care groups and setting one
standard price for each. We define a DRG system as the set of managerial arrangements and
organisational structures that produces these groupings, allocates a corresponding price
(‘tariff’) to each and contracts, monitors and pays healthcare providers accordingly. DRG
systems have at least four characteristics which, the aforementioned suggests, are likely to
necessitate managerial workarounds.
First, policymakers in several countries (e.g. England, Germany, the Netherlands, Greece)
have tried to design DRG systems to achieve two somewhat conflicting aims. One was to
make the costs of health care to payers more predictable and manageable (Covaleski et al.,
1993), make providers more accountable to payers and prevent over-charging (Polyzos et al.,
2013) by setting payment tariffs prospectively instead of reimbursing providers’ actual costs
retrospectively. However, DRG systems also incentivised providers to increase the number of
cases treated and treatment intensity. Evidence from Europe and Australia, but less so from
the United States (where DRGs replaced fee-for-service payments which were already an
incentive to increase activity), tended to indicate increased hospital activity volumes and/or
intensity following DRG introduction (Krabbe-Alkemade et al., 2017; Street et al., 2011).
Expanding healthcare budgets relieved the tension between cost control and incentives for
provider activity but the 2008 financial crisis exacerbated it.
DRG systems secondly allowed providers scope for flexibility and innovation by setting a
cost ceiling beneath which providers were free to reduce their costs, whether by reducing
capital intensity, using less labour, de-skilling, adopting new models of care, selecting
patients or shifting costs elsewhere (e.g. to patients, when reducing lengths of stay)
(Schrey€ogg et al., 2006). (To stop hospitals reducing lengths of stay too much, many DRG
systems pay the hospital nothing more if a patient is re-admitted for treatment for the same
condition too soon after discharge (30 days in England and Germany)). Nevertheless,
differential innovation is likely to make health system behaviour less predictable overall, and
a guaranteed DRG payment means that any savings all accrue to providers not payers.
With other concurrent healthcare reforms a DRG system tended, and in some European
countries was intended, to promote competition. On the payer side, DRGs were originally
designed for subscriber-based healthcare insurance markets or quasi-markets, including those
where a third party (government, social health insurer (SHI), employer or corporate insurer) often
pays on the patient’s behalf. The reforms which promoted DRG systems were also intended, in
Germany and the Netherlands, to stimulate competition between the SHIs. On the provider side,
DRG systemswere intended to stimulate yard-stick competition between providers (in England
and Germany, regional and national comparisons of providers are the yard-sticks), on the basis
of quality rather than cost. Whatever its benefits, competition might also be expected to make
overall health system behaviour less stable, predictable and manageable.
Last, aDRGsystem ishighly structured, being implemented througha complex,voluminous
system of rules, regulations and calculationswhichmust all be reviewed and updated regularly
as clinical classifications, working practices, costs and technologies change.
Other possible antecedents of managerial workarounds do not so obviously apply to DRG
systems. As noted, DRG systems tend to have extensive rather than missing regulations,
organisational structures and information systems and if anything tend to support rather
than threaten managers’ occupational interests. Because DRG systems alter some of the
demarcations between managers and clinicians, clinicians might be expected to resist them.
Yet reports of such resistance to DRGs themselves are rare, partly, perhaps, because DRGs
were designed to be intelligible and meaningful to clinicians. Nevertheless, sufficient
antecedents do apply, to make it likely that DRG systems will incubate managerial
workarounds. For example, studies already report providers up-coding patients to more
European DRG
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lucrative tariffs (‘DRG creep’) and supernumerary negotiations about outlier patients (Cots
et al., 2011). If we wish to discover whether the concept of a managerial workaround has
empirical application, DRG systems would be a good place to look.
2. Research questions
Using data about three DRG systems we therefore consider:
(1) To what extent is the concept of ‘managerial workaround’ capable of empirical
application, particularly to inter-organisational relationships between payers and
providers?
Insofar as it is applicable:
(2) What are the characteristics of such managerial workarounds?
(3) What antecedents or circumstances motivate them?
(4) What does the concept of ‘managerial workaround’ imply for health policy analysis,
hence policy formulation?
3. Methods
3.1 Research design
The study design was to make a qualitative test of the foregoing assumptions about the
antecedents, character and consequences of managerial workarounds. The concept of a
managerial workaround centres on the contrast between the official formulation of a policy
mandate or localmanagerial priorities and the partly contrasting activities that its implementers
undertake in practice. We elicited policymakers’ stated intentions (summarised earlier) for their
DRG systems from published policy documents and interviews with informants in the relevant
national-level (England, Germany) and regional bodies (Italy). The researchers undertook this
work in the respective languages. As evidence about how the systemwas implemented, and any
workarounds, we use data from a larger study of how healthcare payers exercise governance
over service providers (full research report obtainable from the authors).
3.2 Sampling
DRG systems have the same basic architecture but some technical and implementation
details differ between health systems. Italy and England are Beveridge health systems which
have adopted DRG payments to hospitals, Germany the paradigm Bismarckian health
system to do so. German DRGs modify the Australian AR-DRG system. Italian DRGs
followed the US (HCFA) model as did English HRGs (but less closely). By contrasting these
systems, we aimed to elicit which practices, including workarounds, for implementing DRGs
were specific to one particular health system andwhichwere common to all three hence likely
to reflect the nature of DRG systems per se.
Our sampling strategy was to select study sites which by the standards of their respective
health systems had well-developed DRG systems. What that criterion meant in concrete
terms differed for each country. In England, Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCG)
‘commission’, that is, select, contract and pay providers. We selected early established
ones as likely to have the most developed commissioning systems. (CCGs replaced the
essentially similar Primary Care Trusts after 2013. In our study sites, their geographical
configuration and membership had not changed.) For Germany, we selected the SHI whose
DRG systems appeared to have most developed negotiating, informatics, monitoring and
research capacity, and for Italy, the province making the most extensive use of DRGs. Our
study sites were:
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(1) Four English CCGs which together covered the range of CCG organisational
structures, of degree of local hospital competition (by Herfindahl–Hirschmann index)
and extent of collaboration with neighbouring CCGs.
(2) A large German SHI covering the whole country (over 7 millionmembers) and having
over 100 years’ experience as a payer.
(3) Lombardy health region, the first (1995), and when we started fieldwork only, Italian
region using DRGs as its main hospital payment system.
3.3 Data collection
We used similar data collection methods in each country, but (as the funder required) more
extensively in England. In each site we assembled a sample of key informants by snowballing
from the most senior commissioning managers, who identified their counterpart lead
clinicians and managers in secondary care providers and, as applicable, other organisations
involved in the payment system (e.g. at national and/or regional government levels). Since
workarounds involve adapting and supplementing official policies, rules and working
processes, theyweremore likely to be reported in interviews, media rapportage and the action
learning sets which ran in parallel with this research (see further discussion) than in official
policy documents. Official documents and press rapportage, however, offer the most direct
account of the DRG system’s policy rationale. We conducted key informant interviews (20 in
Germany, 24 in Italy, 110 in England) of managers using DRGs at provider (N 5 45) and
payer (N5 109) levels, content-analysed key policy and guidance documents (39 in Germany,
14 in Italy, 57 in England; and for one German hospital, an anonymised set of their standard
contract documents), press rapportage and published papers. Our informants identified for
us the policy and guidance documentsmost relevant to them, and some published studies and
press rapportage. We found further published papers and rapportage by keyword searches
of on-line databases (e.g. PubMed) and reference-chasing from grey studies (e.g. WHO
country reports). There were two main rounds of data collection, the first and larger in 2010–
13 with a second round of supplementary data collection from key informants and
administrative documents during 2018–19 to re-verify, update and extend our data and
findings about all three DRG systems.
We ran an action learning set (in effect, a focus group of practitioners) in which informants
from the three countries exchanged information and ideas about how they paid for health care
in practice. One clinician and onemanager from each of the English study sites participated in
a preliminary set of five workshops. This led to a mini-conference in which informants from
Germany and Italy joined the set to exchange updates and practical ideas. The participants
agreed conclusions at each meeting and from the action learning set overall. Three of the
researchers were facilitators and recorded the findings and conclusions on each occasion.
3.4 Analysis
To compare DRG systems systematically required a common analytic framework and
therefore a framework analysis, assembling the data from all sources from all three countries.
This was logically equivalent into tabulating the data with one (virtual) column per country
and one (virtual) row per research question, followed by sub-analysing the findings for each
research question into sub-themes. Juxtaposing data from the different sources for each
country gave an immediate triangulation, exposing gaps, ambiguities or apparent
contradictions in the data, thereby prompting additional data collection. So far as possible
we analysed transcripts and texts directly in the original language, to avoid the mistake of re-
framing findings from one system with concepts that only apply elsewhere (e.g. the term
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‘commissioning’ has no precise German or Italian equivalent). The patterns in each virtual
row answered our research questions, but also exposed where the inference of new categories
or concepts was required to accommodate unforeseen empirical findings. That, indeed, was
what suggested the distinction between IT or clinician-level workarounds and managerial
workarounds, leading to inference of the further patterns reported next and which structure
this paper as a whole.
3.5 Ethics
An NHS Research Ethics Committee gave ethical approval (reference 09/H0206/50) for
fieldwork in England, the University of Plymouth for fieldwork elsewhere, subject to
informants remaining anonymous.
4. Findings
Space limitations compel us mostly to narrate rather than quote the informants’ data. Fuller
details, including many quotations from interview audio-recordings, are however in the
research report available from the authors.
4.1 System settings and policy problems
Although the German SHIs are largely self-financing (albeit with some government subsidy),
recent health policy has emphasised cost containment. Federal bodies annually set workers’
and employers’ SHI contribution rates, which constrains the SHIs’ global budget. The
German DRG system reimburses the running costs of inpatient care but Land (province)
governments remain responsible for hospital investment, hence each hospital’s bed
allocation. Unlike American but like English and Italian practice, DRGs include the cost of
doctors’ work. Every DRG has a point weighting. Each point earns a fixed number of Euros.
The conversion rate differs Land by Land. Each hospital is entitled to payment for as many
cases as it can attract. Generally the SHIs wish to avoid patient numbers, hence costs, rising
uncontrollably and therefore require a way to mitigate the financial incentives that the DRG
system gives hospitals (Vogl, 2013) for case splitting (dividing up one episode into several,
each with its own DRG), up-coding (J€urges and K€oberlein, 2015), increasing activity and even
over-treatment. For example, an early study in cardiology, which accounts for about
10 percent of hospital spending, found that 56 percent of angioplasties were done in patients
with stable, chronic angina, where angioplasty is not useful (indeed potentially harmful)
(Dissmann and de Ridder, 2002). As another example, hospitals can claim additional
reimbursement if they can document nursing services additional to those covered by
procedure code OPS 9-200 for extensive nursing care. The Medizinische Dienst der
Krankenkassen, which verifies DRG payments to hospitals, reports widespread over-
charging although our SHI informants said that this is usually due to mis-coding or mis-
diagnosis; some hospitals mis-code nearly a third of cases but those that do then face delayed
payment, even cash-flow problems.
In the Italian DRG system, regions are the main payer, with considerable regional
variation in how they use DRGs. Even in the relatively wealthy region we studied, pressures
for cost control have increased, and in 2019 it remains a national policy priority. Most Italian
NHS services were reimbursed retrospectively through DRG-based tariffs, to reflect patient
and GP choices of provider. As in Germany and the Netherlands (Krabbe-Alkemade et al.,
2017), introduction of the DRG systemwas associated with a decrease in hospital admissions
and length of stay, an increase in day-hospital admissions and greater severity of illness
among hospitalised patients (Louis et al., 1999).
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The English ‘Payment by Results’ (PBR) system uses Health Resource Groups (HRGs).
CCGs, nominally controlled by GPs, were the main payers. HRGswere defined independently
of the US prototype but with an essentially DRG-like design and policy rationales and the aim
of increasing provider activity so as to reduce hospital waiting lists, a politically sensitive
issue in the United Kingdom. Our informants also reported that HRGs incentivised hospitals
to treat more cases and more intensive treatments, although hospitals’ rising marginal costs
(e.g. for opening operating theatres at week-ends) limited the expansion. Our commissioner
informants claimed that treatment thresholds had fallen and up-coding had appeared. Health
policy pressures to contain NHS costs were strong in our English study sites. Combined with
patients’ rights to use ‘Any Qualified Provider’, the HRG tariff system weakened the
commissioners’ power to control provider case load and case mix, hence overall costs.
Across all three countries, the DRG system posed a similar complex of problems. It
incentivised hospitals to increase their volume and intensity of treatments (and ‘game’ the
administration of payments) and to reduce the costs of each treatment, but thatmeant costs to
the hospital not costs for the payers. Costs for the payers simply rose, the reverse of national
policies for containing the overall growth of healthcare costs.
4.2 Extending the DRG system
OurGermanSHI andhospitalmanager informants describedhowSHIsworkaround theadverse
incentive effects of the DRG system by negotiating collectively with each hospital, focusing on
spreadsheets that predict the number and case mix of DRGs for the coming year, which implies
DRG points allocation for the hospital. Hospitals’ ‘medical control units’ calculate the costs and
prepare the negotiations with the SHIs. In past years the negotiation had been based on historic
case loads but had become increasingly guided by the SHIs’wishes to save costs, shape services
regionally and contain service expansion. Around the agreed number of DRG points a ‘corridor’
(Flur) was also agreed, defining an upper and a lower limit of the number of cases for each main
group of DRGs. The parties also agreed what rebates the SHI will receive should the volume or
case mix fall below that range and what payment the hospital would receive for justified
additional work above it. These agreements imply notional budgets for each main area of
hospital work. This practice gives a concrete, detailed way of modelling andmanaging hospital
activity, casemix and revenue costs. It is possible to reduce or remove specific kinds of case, even
whole departments, by reallocationswithin the total number of points, but the total tends to be an
incremental increase on the previous year’s figure, constrained within the ‘corridors’. Thus SHIs
‘bundle’ DRG payments in large groups in the interest of cost-containment, while for hospitals
DRG bundling forestalled external micro-scrutiny of their internal activities and gave a stable,
predictable route to such increases in income as the payers could offer.
The Lombardy regional government’s only lever of cost control through the DRG system
was to vary DRG tariff rates and adjust the production ceiling stated in the contract with
providers, that is, the levels of activity at which non-standard tariff payments are made. As
cost-control pressures increased, ‘ceiling budgets’ were introduced into provider contracts,
enforced by tariff caps should service use exceed the planned budget. For ambulatory and
diagnostic services, a provider was guaranteed 95 percent of the previous year’s expenditure
and case load. For activity between 97 percent and 103 percent of the latter, the tariff was cut
by 30 percent; for activity at 103 percent to 106 percent above the previous year the tariff was
cut by 60 percent; and above that the tariff was zero. This arrangement incentivised providers
to achieve the 106 percent level, so as to grow the next year’s baseline budget. By setting a zero
marginal tariff for case load above 106 percent of what had been agreed at the start of each
commissioning cycle, the Lombardy commissioners contained costs by in effect constructing
hybrid of cost-and-volume (below the 106 percent level) and global (‘block’) contracts (above
106 percent). All Italian regions use ceiling budgets, although the ceiling levels vary.
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In England, the study site commissioners worked around the incentive effects of HRGs by
collecting tariff payments into blocks, creatingwhat they called the ‘cap-and-collar’or ‘managed
PBR’ system. If provider activity fell below a certain ‘floor’ or (more likely) exceeded a certain
‘ceiling’ (in our London site, 5 percent above the expected case load), tariff payments for the
marginal activity were reduced by an agreed amount, in one study site to zero. The only
exception to this pattern was that one study commissioner changed its de facto global contract
with a private hospital to HRG tariff payments, a movement in the opposite direction. Overall,
though, thepredominant responsewas tobundle tariff payments in order todampenwhatwere,
for payers, perverse incentive effects. At national level, a shift towards lower, ‘best-practice’
tariff prices (based on costs in the most efficient, not average, hospitals) was announced.
Hospitalmanagers’ reactionsweremixed.They all entered into negotiationswith payers, based
on the ‘cap-and-collar’ workaround. However, in one outer London CCG, the main hospital
agreed to a reduced volume of elective activity, but then still deliberately provided more
services than agreed, presenting the CCG with a fait accompli and corresponding bill. Both in
our study sites and elsewhere NHS hospitals tried (and sometimes managed) to move into and
out of ‘cap-and-collar’ arrangements according to their short-term financial interests.
Health managers in all three systems thus independently invented almost exactly the
same workaround to reduce DRGs’ upward pressure on healthcare costs.
A secondGermanworkaroundwas selective or ‘rebate’ contracts, which German SHIs have
offered since 1998.Aswith some forms ofAmerican ‘managed care’, patientswho opt into these
contracts have a restricted choice of providers in return for lower subscriptions. The selected
providers get a lower DRG payment per case in return for a larger case load. Patients must opt
into these and into integrated care programmes, but many patients assumed that only
providers with difficulty attracting patients accepted such contracts. Where they did not have
latitude to vary the tariff system, the Lombardy commissioners also tried to influence patients’,
and still more GPs’, choice of hospital, including attempts to reduce cross-boundary patient
flows, especially for highly specialized services (e.g. neurosurgery). (Cross-boundary flow was
also an issue in Emilia Romagna.) For example, Mantova ASL, on the border with the Emilia
Romagna and Veneto regions, introduced training schemes encouraging GPs to meet their
patients’ diagnostic and specialised ambulatory care needs within the region and created an
incentive for hospitals tohire specialists to treat suchpatients.Although for planned treatments
EnglishNHSpatients choose their hospital, the reality in our study sites (andmost of theUnited
Kingdom) was that the payers and GPs relied on just one hospital for about two-thirds of their
secondary care, although for certain low- to medium-complexity planned treatments some
corporate and not-for-profit hospitals also treated NHS patients under contract. However, non-
local and non-NHS hospitals were by default paid the full DRG tariff so diverting patients there
would not reduce costs for the payers. The patient-diversion workaround thus appeared in
Germany and Italy but not in England.
4.3 Diminutions of the DRG system
Concomitantly, the study sites limited the commodification of care. As noted, payers and
providers agreed to standard payments only for cases within the ‘corridor’ (see earlier
discussion), with lower payments for those above or below.
Another way of de-commodifying DRG payments was to ‘bundle’ them. Patients with
multiple, especially long-term, conditions often require multiple concurrent treatments, often
from a network of different services. DRGs are designed for funding payments to a single
provider, not networks of multiple providers. Some German SHIs therefore attempted to
introduce disease-management programmes (Kifmann, 2017) providing preventive case
management and continuous care for certain chronic conditions (e.g. diabetes, COPD,
depression, alcoholism). However,
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‘this most of the time only takes place in very classical incidents such as knee, hips etc, that are of an
orthopaedic nature. These are relatively easy to make and are all plannable operations that happen
very often. For more complicated courses of treatment, there is much less’ (SHI manager).
Some of these projects experimentally constructed inter-organisational care pathways
linking primary and secondary care for certain patient groups, a few including many
providers but most only two. Even then, because of the bilateral character of DRG payments,
these networks required specially negotiated contracts rather than the usual DRG payments.
Another workaround is also required from the provider side: to integrate the data about its
patients, who collectively may subscribe to several different SHIs (Hildebrandt et al., 2010). In
some of these Integrierte Versorgung (‘integrated care’) contracts, the DRG price limit for
treatments was also waived. Indeed, a separate payment systemwas authorised for networks
from 2012. However, as with DRGs these contracts had to be re-negotiated annually, causing
high transaction costs for SHIs. Some 14,000 such schemes existed by 2010 but, because
patients had to opt in, only about 5.5 percent of people were then enrolled in them,
representing about 1 percent of healthcare spending. Patients appear somewhat sceptical of
them (Amelung et al., 2012). Cost savings were claimed for 85 percent of the integrated care
schemes (Kielstra, 2011), but in Germany the SHIs also operate the sickness benefit scheme,
which is where the savings would usually materialise.
English payers also wanted to work around the difficulty of paying the networks of
providers which patients with mental health problems and other chronic conditions often
require. CCGs did so by arranging for providers’ representatives to meet in order to negotiate
the assembly of coordinated care pathways, constituting a care network. They called this
‘micro-commissioning’ and regarded it as a method of primary care integration. CCGs
influenced these service providers primarily through negotiation and persuasion, not the
payment system. One CCG engaged an American HMO to help its general practices redesign
services for these care groups, building in risk assessment and telephone support services.
Some CCGs outside our study sites experimentally used ‘year-of-care’ payments which in
effect bundled the HRG payments for chronic disease into annual capitation payments.
In Lombardy, payments for these kinds of services were simply outside the DRG system
altogether. Even for hospital care, a controversial workaround in Lombardy was to
supplement DRGs with ‘Functions with no tariff’ (Funzioni non tariffate: FNT) payments to
reimburse activities that lacked DRG tariffs or that it was considered undesirable to limit
access to (e.g. A&E services, dialysis, foetal and neonatal pathology). FNTswere variable and
at Regional Authority discretion. It can be argued that they represented a system of risk-
adjustment payments for corporate and non-profit hospitals that could not access other
public funds. FNTs were also used for ex-post funding, typically to help public hospitals that
had exceeded their budgets. However, the unclear legal status of FNTs had also created
gaming problems so from 2015 the Regional Authority began to replace them by
supplementing the original DRG system with further new DRGs of its own: a new
workaround to reduce gaming and grey areas andmake the payment systemmore consistent
across private, public and non-for-profit providers. The 2015 reforms considerably changed
regional health system governance and regulation, but nevertheless left the DRG system, and
its workarounds, still working as described earlier. In Germany too, annual contract
negotiations had to cover payments for new treatments not yet in the DRG system.
In contrast to some clinical or IT workarounds, the DRG systems in the countries we
studied had little obvious impact, good or bad, on the quality of care. German DRGs give the
SHIs few direct financial incentives to offer hospitals for improving the quality of care, which
the aforementioned negotiations do not cover. Rather, quality of care is managed when new
types of treatment are considered for inclusion in the DRG payment scheme. The Gemeine
Bundesausschuss (national negotiating body for health policy) sets out quality norms and
guidelines and approves new treatments or diagnostic procedures for temporary, interim
European DRG
systems
payments while they are being evaluated. Those whose evaluation is positive become eligible
for reimbursement through a DRG. In 2012 the Lombardy regional government paid a
variable premium (adjustment) of plus or minus 2 percent of the budget to providers
according to their performance against certain quality standards, but this was a limited
project, directly controlled by the regional general directorates. The English HRG system
contained no direct incentive for improving or reducing service quality, although in one of our
study sites, the district hospitals wanted to discontinue out-posted clinics in small rural
community hospitals because HRG payments did not cover the cost, even though the
commissioner valued these services. When tariff levels exceeded the cost of providing
hospital services, though, HRGs incentivised hospitals not to transfer services to primary
care. In all three systems, our informants did not describe any workarounds to the DRG
system for the purposes of managing the quality of care.
4.4 Informal organisation
In all three countries, these workarounds were formulated during the contract negotiations
between managers from the payer and from the provider sides. The English NHS
negotiations focused, informants said, mostly on costs (and waiting times, for one hospital).
Over time, trust and goodwill accumulated. The negotiators recognised that they would need
each other’s help and goodwill in future. A cap-and-collar agreement was often linked with
other bargains (e.g. letting a hospital close beds provided that its activity levels stayed above
the ‘collar’). In our German site, the SHIs negotiated collectively with each hospital.
Negotiations focused on the hospital’s DRG points allocation, case mix and the nationally
defined growth margin, which together implied an overall number of DRG points and
therefore budget. It was possible to enlarge or add, reduce or even remove, care groups by re-
allocation within the total number of points, which was how the ‘corridor’ was agreed.
Lombardy used two kinds of contract. One, with juridical status, stated the main rules and
quality standards that the provider must comply with but the other, annual operational
contract had no legal status and this was the one which defined the provider’s budget and
activity level, within local targets set by the region. These relationships have been described
as more like a ‘compact’ than a ‘contract’ (Powell, 2007).
These negotiated arrangements were in all three systems formalised in the sense of being
explicitly stated and documented but informal in the sense of being unofficial additions to the
laws, decrees or regulations governing the contracts and their juridical status.
5. Discussion
Across the three countries, essentially the same managerial workarounds of the DRG system
emerged. They had no statutory basis, but were enacted collectively and by explicit
negotiation. Insofar as payer–provider negotiations are inherent to a DRG system, the
aforementioned workarounds might be regarded as an example of managers extending an
official inter-organisational structure and informational resources for additional uses, that is,
system planning and cost control. They exploited and stretched managerial discretion. The
DRG workarounds did not much alter or supplement what organisational-level or inter-
organisational monitoring data the managers received, but payer managers did make
additional, non-standard uses of boundary objects (contracts, spreadsheets, etc.) and so
widened the possible range of managerial responses to those data. In England and Germany,
these and other workarounds were used to develop and support emerging inter-provider care
networks for providing integrated care. However, these managerial workarounds did not
have all the characteristics that our initial conceptualisation predicted. They added rather
than removed warning systems and activity over-rides and increased rather than reduced
managerial work. They did not involve alternative diagnostic typologies, nor fudging or re-
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negotiating diagnostic codes. Neither insufficient resources or time for managerial work, nor
its over-complexity, motivated the workarounds reported earlier. Neither did any threat to
managers’ occupational interests. Given a policy mandate for cost control, the workarounds
attenuated what payers foresaw (and sometimes experienced) as perverse consequences of
the DRG system, in the absence of official organisational structures or systems for controlling
or mitigating these consequences.
These findings have various limitations and caveats. We report DRG workarounds only
for three European systems. However, DRG system modifications similar to those we
investigated have been reported (or rather, mentioned briefly) in studies of Austria, Greece
(Polyzos et al., 2013), Ireland, Portugal, Spain (Catalonia), Sweden, Poland (Kowalska, 2007)
and parts of the United States (Cutler and Ghosh, 2012). Other writers report the ‘bundling’ of
patient episodes, meaning the workaround described earlier which ‘bundles’ together the
payments for the multiple patients in the same DRG group. Others, especially in the United
States but also, for example, in the Netherlands (Bakker et al., 2012), use the term ‘bundle’
differently to mean combining all the different DRG payments for one individual patient who
receives multiple treatments, perhaps from multiple providers, similar to the NHS ‘year of
care’ model described earlier. Although we focused on hospitals, DRG-like systems are
increasingly being applied to non-hospital services. In many countries DRGs coexist with
non-DRG or pre-DRG systems (Cots et al., 2011). If workarounds emerge from particular local
health system settings, our findings may also reflect a specific stage in DRG-system
development, perhaps one that will pass. We have reported how payers managed DRGs at
inter-organisational level and in light of broad health policy aims, rather than more technical
DRG development such as a new ICD, groupers, provider cost accounting systems, ways of
converting DRG tariffs into money prices or modelling methods. Neither have we considered
how hospital competition may affect DRG workarounds. We selected payers whose DRG
systems were well-developed in terms of their managerial systems, extent and intensity of
DRG use. If this selection did bias our findings (which is not obvious), the bias would be
towards reporting the most extensive and elaborate managerial workarounds in each DRG
system. Healthcare is not the only sector that incubates managerial workarounds (Ledeneva,
2009). Synthesising our findings with those from elsewhere would refine the
conceptualisations proposed earlier.
6. Conclusion: managerial workarounds as diagnostic – and remedial?
Nevertheless, this study adds several things to existing knowledge. One is additional
evidence about the internal workings of DRG systems in three health systems, in particular a
workaround which is often noticed but seldom deeply examined. So far as we are aware, no
other study develops the concept of a ‘managerial workaround’, tests it empirically or
explains how managerial workarounds occur. In motivation, means and consequences,
managerial workarounds differ from most forms of policy–practice gap reported in the
implementation literature. Managers’ motivation was not to make the DRG system do
something other than policymakers intended, as happens when non-managers ‘capture’ a
policy or when policy goal displacement (Abramson, 2009) occurs. Neither did the present
workarounds arise from managers failing to understand how to enact the DRG policy, nor
from policy ambiguity or mis-specification, for DRG systems are clearly specified and highly
formalised. Rather the opposite: those making the workarounds intended to achieve
policymakers’ aims more fully and despite (in this case) some of the incentives arising from
the commodified character of DRGs. Their motivation was not primarily symbolic (e.g.
external image management, increasing managerial power over clinicians) as institutionalist
theory might suggest but concrete and practical (in this case, cost control, case mix and
referral planning). It was remedy not resistance.
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As means to realise these intentions, the managerial workarounds reported here, like
work-process workarounds generally, go beyond passive non-implementation, shortcuts
(Lalley and Malloch, 2010) or just exercising discretion within the structures that a given
policy creates. They extended the structures that DRG policy introduced. Because these
extensions were formalised, impersonal and stable, they were capable of becoming
normalised (May and Finch, 2009), over time, as permanent inter-organisational structures.
These developments were indeed emergent, but from conflicts between policy goals
(stimulating hospital activity versus cost control) not conflicts between interest groups or
conflicting implementation structures for a single policy. Consequently the managerial
workarounds ‘decoupled’ organisations’ actual work processes only in a specific, restricted
way from those organisations’ formal structures and external image presentation (Covaleski
et al., 1993). Managers’ work practices were only decoupled from DRGs’ policy-defeating
consequences, not from the normative foundations of the DRG system. Hence, themanagerial
workarounds described here should not necessarily be dismissed (as policy–practice gaps
often are) as implementation failures. Rather, they were implementation repairs.
Our findings suggest that a widespread managerial workaround may therefore be a
response to policy incoherence. The workarounds that we report appear to be symptomatic of
design problemswith DRGs, and therefore DRG systems, at a basic level.Whatmotivated the
DRGworkarounds was the practical incompatibility of two policy objectives. One was DRGs’
market conformity. DRGs were designed as a commodified payment system (payment per
episode of care) to incentivise providers to increase activity (and on some definitions,
‘efficiency’). The other objective was system-wide cost control. To remove that underlying
incompatibilitywould require policy shifts, but themanagerial workarounds themselvesmay
suggest what shifts. The workarounds described earlier produced provider contracts that
retained the informational strengths of DRGs, made providers’ expected incomes and case
mix transparent and uniformly defined across providers, while also defining the payers’ care
costs prospectively and constituting a means of cost control for both payers and providers.
Themanagerial workaround converted DRGpayments into a specific kind of flexible, weakly
incentivised global (‘block’) contract system, a hybrid system for assembling flexible global
budgets from estimates of patient-level activity and DRG payments.
Health policy researchers who discover pervasive, non-trivial managerial workarounds
might therefore consider them a prompt to investigate further whether that discovery is
symptomatic, in turn, of inconsistent policy objectives, or of a conflict between those
objectives and the organisational structures intended to realise them, but also whether the
workarounds themselves may contain solutions to these problems.
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